This paper investigates the nature of policy conflict in the Korean National Assembly via a spatial analysis of its members' voting. We discover the main dimensions of conflict and look at the impact of institutions and members' preferences on their reveal spatial locations.
we present the results from applying a standard geometric scaling technique (NOMINATE) to the KNA. We then use a regression analysis to look at the exogenous ideological and institutional determinants of voting in the KNA.
Dimensions of Conflict in Legislatures
By scaling roll-call votes political scientists can measure the dimensions of conflict in a chamber, the locations of the parties and parliamentarians on these dimensions, and how the dimensions and locations change over time. However, two main factors influence how the exogenous preferences of parties and individual parliamentarians are 'revealed' in observed conflicts: strategic behavior and institutions.
First, rather than expressing their sincere preferences, parliamentarians often vote strategically. For example, in many parliamentary systems, extremist members of the governing party often vote with opposition against the government. As a result, the first dimension in many parliamentary systems represents a government-opposition split rather than a continuous left-right ideological dimension. 5 Second, a wide range of institutions 'constrain' the ability of parliamentarians to vote sincerely. Such institutions include, inter alia whether the legislative agenda is set by the parliament or the government, whether the parliament operates an open or closed amendment rule, whether the electoral system is party-centered or candidate-centered, whether candidates are selected centrally or locally, and whether political parties can enforce party discipline.
Where parties are concerned, their ability to enforce 'cohesion' is in part endogenous to the institutions of government. In parliamentary systems, parties in government can use vote-of-confidence motions to force their supports to 'back them or sack them'. 6 In contrast, in presidential systems, even if the party controlling the executive has a majority in the legislature, the survival of the executive is not threatened by a lack of party discipline in the legislature. 7 Nevertheless, even in presidential systems, such as South Korea, there are internal incentives for parliamentary parties to form and discipline their members. 8 Parliamentarians could cooperate spontaneously, but this would mean that coalitions would have to be negotiated vote by vote. As a result, politicians who expect to have similar preferences on a range of policy issues can reduce the transactions costs of coalition-building by agreeing a division-of-labor, where 'leaders' decide the main policy positions and issue voting instructions, while 'backbenchers' provide labor, such as working out the position of the party on specific issues.
Consequently, one of the main tasks of research on voting in parliaments is to try to estimate the significance and magnitude of these two intervening forces. In the case of the U.S. Congress, where parties are relatively weak and where position-taking incentives are perhaps evenly distributed across members of Congress, the revealed locations of members of Congress may be very similar to their ideal points. 9 In many parliamentary systems, in contrast, where parties are highly cohesive and where government-opposition incentives often force opposition parties to take positions in votes that are in conflict with their policy preferences, the revealed locations of members of parliament are likely to be quite different from their ideal preferences.
In this respect, the Korean National Assembly is an interesting chamber for looking at the effects of institutions on parliamentary voting. First, as in most other democratic parliaments, parties in the KNA try to discipline their members. Second, the KNA has a mixed-member electoral system, where some members are elected in single-member districts and others are elected by party-list proportional representation in one single national constituency. These rules provide different incentives for candidates in the electoral and parliamentary arenas, in that the candidates who are elected in the single-member districts have a greater incentive to appeal directly to voters than the candidates who are elected on the 'closed' party lists. 10 Third, both the president and the legislature can initiate legislation, and the budget is proposed by the president. Whereas during the 16th KNA, the president and the KNA were controlled by opposing parties, in the 17th KNA, the president's party had a majority in the KNA. As a result, agenda-setting and veto-powers were split between two opposing parties in the 16th KNA, but these powers were united in a single party in the 17th
KNA. Regarding the party system, South Korean politics is dominated by a regional divide in the electorate. 13 Nevertheless, most commentators also identify a 'conservativeprogressive' ideological dimension in Korean politics and three distinct ideological traditions. 14 First, the dominant 'conservative' party is the GNP, although there are several other conservative parties that win seats, such as the United Liberal Democrats (LDU).
Elections and Parties in the Korean National Assembly
Second, the 'progressive' tradition is mainly associated with President Kim Dae-Jung and his
Millennium Democratic Party (MNDP). However, the largest party in this tradition is now the Uri Party (UP), which was formed as a breakaway from the MNDP. The UP is generally regarded as to the left and more populist than the MNDP. Third, a 'socialist' tradition is further to the left of the progressive parties, and has been mainly represented in the 17th KNA by the Democratic Labor Party (DLP).
The substantive content of this progressive-conservative dimension is unclear, as it captures several underlying issue dimensions, such as security questions surrounding policies towards North Korea and the United States (a 'dove-hawk' dimension), economic spending and market regulation policies (an economic left-right dimension), and attitudes towards social questions like the rights of women and foreigners in Korean society (a social left-right dimension). The 'progressive' end of the spectrum is usually associated with a more dovish ('sunshine') policy towards North Korea, more public expenditure, and liberal social policies.
On the other side, the 'conservative' end of the spectrum is usually associated with more hawkish policies towards North Korea, free market economic policies, and traditional social policies. However, not all parties and KNA members advocate such clearly correlated positions.
[ Table 1 About Here] were over 550 roll-call votes in the first year of the 17th KNA. However, as Table 2 shows, in both sessions of the KNA, the overwhelming majority of roll-call votes were highly lopsided. In the 16th KNA, 87 percent of votes had majorities of 95 percent or greater. In the 17th KNA, the proportion of votes with this size majority or greater declined slightly, to 77
percent, but still remained high compared to most other democratic parliaments.
[ Table 2 About Here]
We apply a standard geometric scaling technique, known as NOMINATE. 15 NOMINATE utilizes a parametric and stochastic model, and recovers information about individual legislator and roll-call vote characteristics by exploiting the assumption of the probabilistic spatial model that some errors are more likely than others. 16 The method also assumes that classification errors are distributed according to a logistic function, and that errors are independent and identically distributed across both legislators and votes.
It is standard practice when applying NOMINATE to exclude roll-call votes where the majority size is greater than 97 percent. However, as this would have excluded a large number of votes in the KNA, we set the cut-off point at 99.5 percent. This does not have a significant effect on the ideal point estimates of the KNA members. However, increasing the cut-off point allows a greater number of roll-call votes and KNA members to be scaled.
[ Table 3 About Here] Table 3 The maps suggest several things. The first dimension in the 16th session appears to capture the government-opposition as well as the progressive-conservative dimension, with the UP furthest to the 'left', the MNDP in the 'centre', and the GNP furthest to the 'right'.
The first dimension in the 17th session also appears to be the government-opposition dimension, with the most progressive DLP in the middle of the UP and the GNP. However, in this session, the second dimension might also be an ideological dimension, as the most leftwing party, the DLP, is at the top of the figure.
Second, the maps reveal a significant shift in the structure of inter-party voting between the 16th KNA and the 17th KNA, where voting was considerably more fragmented in the 16th session but then become more clearly bi-polar in the 17th KNA. One change between the two sessions was in the structure of the party system, as a result of the UP breaking away from the MNDP. However, after the formation of UP, the three main parties (UP, GNP and MNDP) were the same in the 16th and 17th KNA. Also, the electoral system and the substantive issues on the agenda were broadly the same for both sessions.
Nonetheless, the main exogenous institutional change between these two periods was the shift from divided government in the 16th KNA to unified government in the 17th KNA.
This shift had a significant effect on legislative agenda. In the 16th KNA, both the majority party in the legislature (GNP) and the party controlling the presidency (MNDP then UP) had the power to veto legislation. In the 17th KNA, in contrast, veto power was monopolized by UP. Hence, whereas in the 16th KNA there was legislative gridlock, in the 17th KNA the UP dominated the legislative process. The result, as the maps suggest, was a fragmented legislative coalition in the 16th KNA and a clearer government-opposition split in the 17th
KNA.
Third, the parties are not as cohesive as one might expect, as there is considerable dispersion in the location of the members of each of the main parties. However, it is worth reiterating that there was a high level of overall consensus in both KNA, as revealed by the distribution of vote-splits, which by-definition means that on most votes the parties were highly cohesive.
Determinants of Voting in the KNA
These maps hence suggest some ways of interpreting the substantive meaning of the dimensions. However, 'eyeballing' these maps does not tell us anything about individuallevel variations in KNA members' locations, the effects of electoral institutions on KNA
voting, or what explains variation in voting behavior within the political parties. To investigate these issues we undertake a regression analysis, using exogenous preference-based and institutional variables to predict individual KNA members' locations.
Model and Variables
Our basic model of KNA members' voting behavior is as follows:
where the dependent variable, LOCATION, is a vector of two related dependent variables.
The first variable is the simple Cartesian location of a KNA member, m, on either the first or second dimension recovered by NOMINATE. From these scores we calculate a second dependent variable: the 'revealed distance' of each KNA member from the median Cartesian location of his or her political group on the first and second dimensions.
Regarding the independent variables, the term PREFERENCE is a vector of several exogenous measures of individual members' preferences, and hence captures the direct relationship between individual members' underlying ideological preferences and their voting behavior. The data for this variable come from a survey of the members of the 16th and 17th
KNAs, where each member was asked about his or her attitudes on a variety of policy questions. 17 The survey of the 16th KNA contained questions on external security, internal security, aid for North Korea, reforming the conglomerates, rights of small shareholders, welfare spending, protection of the environment, private high-school education, gender equality, and capital punishment. The survey of the 17th KNA included these categories and added questions on sending Korean troops to Iraq, participation of labor unions in management, dual citizenship, foreign direct investment, rights of foreign workers, and introducing markets in education provision. On each question, the KNA members were asked to locate themselves on a four-point scale: either strongly in favor of the provision, conditionally in favor, conditionally opposed, or strongly opposed.
From these survey data we created two sets of measures of KNA members'
preferences. First, we undertook a principal-components factor analysis of the responses to all the questions, and calculated the preferences of the KNA members in each session on the first two unrotated factors produced by the analysis. In the 16th KNA, the first factor explains 35 percent of the variance and the second factor explains an additional 11 percent. In the 17th
KNA, the first factor explains 30 percent of the variance and the second factor explains an additional 8 percent. Because the questions relating to security issues and economic issues both load highly on the first factor, we call this dimension of preferences We recoded the factor-based and additive dimensions so that 0 is at the progressive/left end and 1 is at the conservative/right end. We then re-scaled all the dimensions between 0 and 1, to make it simpler to compare the magnitudes of the relationships between these measures of KNA members' ideological preferences and their revealed spatial locations. There is of course a high correlation between the two factor-score based dimensions and the three simple additive dimensions. We consequently enter the factor-based dimensions and the additive dimensions in separate models.
In the models that relate to the second independent variable, on the revealed distance of each KNA member from his or her party, we recode these ideological variables as measures of each KNA member's ideological distance form the median member of his or her party. To do this, we use the individual KNA members' locations to calculate the median ideological location of each party in the 16th and 17th KNA, and then calculated the ideological distance of each KNA member from his or her party in each KNA session. The idea, here, is that instead of a KNA member's absolute exogenous ideological preferences predicting his or her absolute revealed location, we assume that a KNA member's personal ideological heterogeneity from his or her party predicts the member's voting variance from his or her party.
The PARTY term in the model is a vector of dummy variables for each of the parties in the 16th and 17th KNA. We estimate separate models with these variables excluded and with them included. When the party dummies are included, the coefficients on the other independent variables relate to average variance within each party's group of KNA members.
The ELECTORAL INSTITUTIONS term represents the effect of electoral institutions on voting behavior and on each KNA member's voting variance from the median member of his or her party. Here we use a single dummy variable, Party list, which takes the value 1 if the KNA member was elected on a proportional representation party-list and 0 if the KNA member was elected in a single-member district.
Finally, the SENIORITY term is a vector of two control variables that capture potential individual-level seniority effects. The first variable, Times elected, is the number of times a member had been elected to the KNA. The second variable, Age, is the age of each KNA member in the 16th and 17th sessions. Presumably, longer-serving and older KNA members are more 'senior' in their parties and in the KNA leadership structures, and so are more able to influence the policy positions of their parties and the agenda of the KNA compared to more junior members.
We estimate the models using OLS regression. Descriptive statistics for all the variables are contained in the Appendix. Table 4 shows the results for the 16th KNA and Table 5 shows the results for the 17th KNA.
Results
The main findings are as follows. First, regarding the substantive content of the main dimension of voting, KNA members' preferences on the general progressive-conservative dimension of Korean politics are highly significant in both sessions of the parliament. The magnitude of the relationship between exogenous progressive-conservative preferences and revealed voting is also large. For example, in both sessions, a 10 percent movement along the progressive-conservative scale corresponds to about a 7.5 percent movement along the first dimension recovered by NOMINATE (from models 1 and 9). KNA members' progressiveconservative preferences in the 16th KNA also explain voting variations within parties on the first dimension, as revealed in the models with party dummies.
[ Tables 4 and 5 About Here]
Furthermore, looking at the three additive scales from the surveys of KNA members' preferences reveals that security issues are the dominant aspect of progressive-conservative politics in the KNA. KNA members' economic preferences are significant in the 16th KNA but not in the 17th KNA. Also, in the 16th KNA, the magnitude of the relationship between preferences on economic issues and voting in this parliament is less than one-quarter the magnitude of the relationship between 'dove-hawk' preferences and voting.
Second, the substantive meaning of the second dimension is less clear. In the 16th KNA, this dimension appears to relate mostly to liberty-authority factors. In the 17th KNA, in contrast, the second dimension is more associated with economic left-right preferences.
Combined progressive-conservative preferences are significant here. However, looking at the three additive scales reveals that although security and economic preferences are both significant, preferences on the economic left-right dimension are approximately twice as substantively important as preferences on the dove-hawk dimension. This is the case between parties as well as within parties, as the models with the party dummies reveal.
Third, turning to institutional effects, adding parties raises the explanatory power of the models enormously. For example, in the models of the 16th KNA, the R-squared on the first dimension doubles when party dummies are included in the results. And, in the models of the 17th KNA, the R-squared on the first dimension almost trebles when party dummies are included. This consequently reveals that parties were stronger determinants of voting in the 17th KNA than in the 16th KNA.
Fourth, the effect of electoral institutions is unclear. In the 17th KNA, for example, members who were elected on party lists were less progressive than members who were elected in single-member districts. We speculate that this is caused by the characteristics of the members elected on the proportional party lists. Those elected on the proportional party lists tended to be either older party leaders or newcomers in politics. The latter tended to be recruited because their contribution to party finances or party profile as well-known public figures. As members of the social and economic establishment, these politicians tend to be conservative, especially on security issues. However, this does not reveal anything about the effect of electoral institutions on the relationship between parliamentarians and their party leaders.
Fifth, the impact of seniority is clearer in the 17th KNA than in the 16th KNA.
Longer serving and older KNA members tend to be more progressive than newer and younger KNA members. However, again, this may have more to do with the proportions of younger and older members in each party's cohort of parliamentarians than internal party relationships.
To look at the effects of preferences and institutions on variations within parties, Table   6 shows the results of the models where the dependent variable is the revealed voting variance [ Table 6 About Here]
Second, electoral institutions were only significant in the 16th KNA. Interestingly, though, members elected on proportional party lists were more likely to vote against their parties than members elected in single-member districts. At face value, this seems to be against the expectation that politicians elected in single-member districts are likely to be more independent from their party leaders than politicians elected on closed party lists. However, this may be because many of those elected by on the proportional lists were well-known figures with their own independent support bases. Also, the lower degree of independence of those elected in the single-member districts reflects the influence of the party leaderships in nominating candidates in safe districts, for example where there is strong regional support for the parties.
Third, older politicians were less likely to vote against their parties in both sessions of the KNA. However, the number of times a member was elected had no significant effect.
[ Figure 4 About Here]
Finally, the kernel density plots in Figure 4 illustrate the effect of parties on the translation of exogenous preferences into revealed voting behavior in the KNA. When asked to locate themselves on a series of policy issues, there is considerable overlap in the preferences of the members of the two main parties (UP and GNP). However, in their revealed voting behavior, the effect of party discipline means that these two groups of parliamentarians are clearly distinct.
Conclusion
Our study of voting in the KNA shows that parties in South Korea are able to articulate the main dimensions of political conflict in South Korean society inside the Assembly. To begin with, we find that parties in the KNA are relatively highly disciplined, despite the fact that South Korea is a presidential system, where party leaders have few powers to enforce party discipline. This is also despite a high level of heterogeneity in the preferences of the members of the main political parties. Competition between the main political parties is a stronger determinant of voting behavior than either the personal preferences of the individual KNA members or whether KNA members are elected in single-member districts or on party lists.
The shift from divided government in the 16th KNA to unified government in the 17th KNA sharpened the partisan structure of voting in the KNA.
Despite strong party cohesion leading to a high level of consensus in voting in the KNA, we also find that when contested votes are held, the conflicts between parties are predominantly explained by the underlying 'progressive-conservative' ideological conflict in Korean electoral politics. The security policy aspect of this conflict, relating mainly to policies towards North Korea and the United States, is more salient than the economic policy aspect of this conflict, which is present but plays a less significant role. These 'dove-hawk' preferences structured voting in the 16th session, in a period of divided government and before the formation of the Uri Party, as well as in the 17th session, after President Roh's UP had won a majority in the assembly.
Nevertheless, there is a second dimension of voting in the KNA. This is clearly present in both sessions of the KNA, although it is far less significant than the first dimension.
The substantive policy meaning of this dimension changes between the 16th and 17th KNAs.
While in the 16th session the second dimension related mainly to social policy preferences, such as the rights of women and foreigners in Korean society, in the 17th session this dimension related more to economic policy issues such as welfare spending and reform of the Korean conglomerates.
Not surprisingly, given the salience of security issues on the Korean peninsula and the stakes involved, the security dimension swamps socio-economic and socio-political concerns in South Korean legislative politics. However, this raises an important issue about the nature and sustainability of South Korean democracy. In virtually all other democratic polities, the main dimension of conflict in democratic politics relates to the battle for resources between the main groups in capitalist society. On this dimension, the basic redistributive contracts are struck via the electoral and parliamentary process, which allows capitalism to function with only limited socio-economic heterogeneity. 18 If politics in South Korea are not about the basic socio-economic conflicts in capitalist society, there is a danger that these conflicts will remain unresolved, and that the gains of rapid South Korea growth will lead to high levels of economic disparity in this country. Note: The method is OLS regression. P-values are in parentheses. Note: The method is OLS regression. The dependent variable is the revealed absolute distance of a KNA member from the median member of his/her party on the relevant dimension (e.g. NOMINATE dimension 1, Optimal Classification dimension 1, etc.). P-values are in parentheses.
